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Miami, Florida
July 20, 1978

THE TRANSFORMATION OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTING

The public accounting profession has come under heavy
attack in recent times because of the perceptions of its critics

and the emerging recognition, particularly in Congress, of the
importance of the role of auditors and financial reporting.

The

criticisms of the profession are leading to profound changes,
especially in the role and responsibilities of auditors.

Because

the ultimate objective of these changes is to provide improved
corporate accountability they will have a significant impact on
corporate management as well.

To place the recent developments in perspective let me
give you a brief overview of why the profession has come under

such heavy criticism.
Auditors have traditionally been looked to as a

principal means of providing a reasonable degree of assurance
as to the reliability of financial statements to help protect
investors and credit grantors from being misled by misrepresenta

tions or frauds.

More recently, however, the function has taken

on added dimensions because government officials have come to
realize that:

1.

Financial statements underlie the financial
data and statistics which are used in the
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formation of national policies, particularly

those relating to the economy and capital
formation.

2.

Independent audits are a vital ingredient in
the scheme of control over the conduct and

accountability of the corporate entity within

our society.
It is understandable, then, that when audited financial

statements prove to have been misleading on the basis of subsequent

events, such as unheralded business failures, questions are raised
as to how this could happen.

Assumptions are made that the

auditors failed to meet their responsibilities either as a result

of deficient performance of their work, or worse, that they knowingly
placed their imprimatur on misleading financial statements.

These perceptions stem in large part from the often

unconscious belief that an auditor’s opinion should be expected
to provide an absolute guarantee that:

1.

Financial statements are reliable without

qualification and that
2.

Any material management frauds have been detected
and disclosed.

Even more extreme is the expectation that the auditor

is representing by his opinion that the judgments and actions
of management have been of high quality and in the best interests
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of all who may rely on the financial statements.

Some also seem

to expect that an auditor’s opinion denotes that investment in
or extensions of credit to the company will be both safe and

profitable.
These exaggerated expectations contribute heavily to

the belief on the part of many critics that the profession is
failing to satisfactorily carry out its mission.

Anything less

than zero defects in financial reporting is viewed by these

individuals as being unsatisfactory.
The profession devoutly shares the desire to reach

such a state of perfection in an imperfect world.

But attain

ment of such an objective is not a realistic expectation.

Among

the principal reasons why this is so are:
1.

Cost/benefit considerations necessarily place

limits on the amount of audit tests that are

performed.

Thus audit tests are applied on a

sample basis rather than to 100% of all trans

actions .
2.

Even if 100% of all transactions are verified
the reliability of financial statements could

not be absolutely guaranteed because they are
based upon guesses about the future such as

collectibility of receivables or the useful

lives of productive facilities.

3.

Management fraud defies detection by due auditing
care when it involves cleverly executed collusion
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between related parties, forgery or trans

actions which are not recorded on the books

or records.
4.

The auditing profession, like all professional

groups, cannot reasonably expect to eliminate
all breakdowns in performance or integrity on
the part of a small percentage of its members.

Because these factors make it impossible for auditors

to provide absolute assurance as to the reliability of financial
statements the question is often asked "what good are audits if

they don’t provide complete protection?"

The answer, of course,

is that audits do provide a reasonable degree of protection and

do prevent many cases where financial statements would otherwise

be misleading.

The fact that zero defects are not achieved is

not a valid basis for concluding that the auditing function is
necessarily being performed in an unsatisfactory manner.
Even though perfection is not attainable, the profession
has a responsibility to strive constantly to improve the effective

ness of audits to the maximum extent that is reasonably achievable.

Accordingly it is entirely appropriate to ask the question of
whether the profession is satisfactorily meeting that responsibility.

To answer that question, the AICPA appointed a special
commission in 1974 to examine the responsibilities of auditors in
the light of legitimate expectations of the public.

Prior to his
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untimely death, the Commission was chaired by Manuel Cohen, former

Chairman of the SEC.

The Commission was initially composed of

seven members, four drawn from other disciplines and interest
groups and three from the ranks of the auditing profession.

A report on its preliminary conclusions was published
on April 1, 1977.

Based upon responses and public hearings on

its tentative views the Commission has now completed its work

and its final report was published on February 1, 1978.

The-report contains

over 40 recommendations for improving the way in which the profes

sion meets its responsibilities.

The conclusions are based in

part upon an extensive body of research into the underlying causes

of the allegations directed at the auditing profession.

Unfortunately

the Commission directed only a limited amount of its attention to

the question of whether public expectations were unreasonable and,
if so, what might be done to solve this problem.
In the meantime, while the Commission was deliberating,

the fast-moving developments within federal government circles

relating to the profession made it necessary for the profession
to respond in its own behalf to the allegations being made about
its performance.

The Metcalf subcommittee staff study of the

profession and the Moss subcommittee report on its oversight of

the SEC raised a number of fundamental questions that required an

immediate and comprehensive response if unwanted legislation was

to be avoided.
In general, it was asserted in these reports that the
performance of auditors has not been as good as it should be.

The
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reasons for this judgment were not clearly articulated but
invariably when this judgment is made the number of spectacular

business failures which occurred during the last decade are cited

as evidence.
To a large extent the criticisms are a result of a

loss of confidence in the integrity of business.

The energy

crisis spawned widespread doubts about the reliability of the
financial and statistical reports of the oil and gas industry. Also,
the revelations about illegal political contributions, bribes

and off-book slush funds caused untold damage to the credibility
of corporate management.
It does not follow, of course, that these events were

necessarily accompanied by failures of auditors to meet their
responsibilities.

Nevertheless it is clear that the result has

been a serious erosion in the credibility of the independent
auditors.

This loss of confidence is focused principally on

perceptions that audit failures occur because:
1.

The accounting and auditing standards being set
in the private sector

are deficient in quality,

quantity and timeliness.

Therefore it is sug

gested by some that the setting of these standards

should be transferred to a government agency.

2.

The auditors were negligent and exercised poor

judgment or were not sufficiently independent
of their clients and either knowingly or

-7-

unconsciously protected the interests of manage

ment at the expense of shareholders and other
users of financial statements.

3.

The profession’s technical, independence and due
care standards are not being enforced and CPAs

and CPA firms are not being adequately punished.
Therefore the SEC is urged by the critics to

exercise its enforcement authority more vigorously

and additional forms of governmental regulation
of the profession are alleged to be necessary.
These perceptions are so serious that the profession can

ill afford to ignore them even if they are greatly exaggerated.

I

believe it is safe to say that a great majority of the profession

would vigorously assert that such conclusions are not supported
by the facts.

Unfortunately it is difficult to mount objective

proof that the indictment of the profession’s performance is either
warranted or unwarranted.

In any event, if those who are judging the profession
are convinced that reforms are necessary it is not terribly

effective to tell them their judgments are faulty and to engage

in what has become popularly known as "stonewalling”.

The

distinctions between appearances and fact have become so blurred

in our society that it is almost irrelevant as to whether
appearances are distorted.

Thus the profession has taken action
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to effect changes based upon the allegations of its critics even

though I am certain that a great many CPAs are unconvinced of the

validity of the necessity for such reforms.

Because of the perceived deficiencies in the performance
of auditors and the accountability of corporate management there
has been an avalanche of recommendations for reform.

These have

been put forward by congressional committees and their staffs,
the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, the SEC and by CPAs

themselves in their testimony and written submissions to Congress.

Some of the suggested changes were already under consideration by

the AICPA even before they were recommended by others.
Many of the changes, particularly those in response to
the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, are aimed at improved
corporate accountability.

Others are intended to bolster the

independence of auditors and establishing an effective system of

regulation of CPA firms.
For purposes of simplification I will discuss the more
important recommendations under four categories:

1.

Accounting and Auditing Standards.

2.

Regulation of the Profession.

3.

Independence of Auditors and Improved Corporate

Accountability.
4.

Relief for Small and/or Closely Held Businesses.

5.

Other Matters.
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Because of time constraints I will discuss only very

briefly each of the items under these classificiations.

I belie
ve

this will be sufficient to convince you that the profession is

indeed undergoing major and far-reaching changes and that many of
the changes will have a significant impact on corporate accountability.
I.

Accounting and Auditing Standards

At various times individual members of Congress have
expressed concern about allowing the private sector to set

accounting standards.

Some have alleged that misleading financial

statements have occurred because the private-sector standard setting

bodies have been unwilling to eliminate accounting alternatives

that were advantageous to corporate interests.
to assert that the auditing

These critics tend

profession has been the captive of its

clients and is not to be entrusted with direct responsibility for

setting the standards.

The suggested cure has been to transfer the standard
setting to a government body.

Some have urged that the SEC exercise

its existing statutory authority by rescinding its policy of looking

to the FASB.

Others have recommended that the GAO or a wholly new

governmental body be given the responsibility to set accounting

standards.

As a result of a vigorous defense of the FASB before
congressional committees it currently appears that the recommendations
for government setting of accounting standards will not prevail.
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This issue has, at least for the time being, cooled down and been

replaced by proposals for additional federal regulation of the

profession.

Nevertheless the present arrangement between the SEC

and the FASB is not entirely secure and its future is inextricably
intertwined with the fate of the profession with respect to
possible federal regulation.

The jurisdiction over the setting of auditing standards
has also become the subject of recommendations for change.

Congressman Moss has suggested that such standards be set either
by the SEC or under a statutory regulatory body for the profession
similar to the National Association of Securities Dealers.

Also

the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities recommended that

the Institute’s present auditing standards executive committee be

converted into a full-time paid board and suggested other
structural changes, as well.

In response to these recommendations the Institute

appointed a special committee to study the present structure of
AudSEC and recommend what changes, if any, should be considered in

the way auditing standards are established.

The committee released

a summary of its recommendations on March 1, 1978.

Among other

things, it recommended the retention of an all-volunteer body of

15 members within the Institute to set auditing standards.

Also,

to provide a formal vehicle for obtaining the views of interested
user groups outside the profession, establishment of an advisory

council was recommended.

The committee’s report is currently under

consideration by the AICPA’s Board of Directors and Council.
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Retention of the establishment

of both accounting

and auditing standards in the private sector is dependent to a

large

extent upon whether the profession is successful in avoiding federal
legislation to establish a statutory regulatory system for the

profession.

If such a

regulatory body were to be

established under the oversight of the SEC the odds would be

very high that the functions of both AudSEC and the FASB would

be included under the new

II.

structure.

Regulation of the Profession
Congressman Moss’s subcommittee recently completed

hearings which focused on the progress of the profession toward
establishing an improved system of self-regulation.

Mr. Moss

has stated publicly on several occasions that if he was not

satisfied

he would introduce legislation to establish a quasi-

govemmental body similar to the National Association of Securities
Dealers and under the oversight of the SEC to regulate the profession.
The Institute's response has been to establish a division

for CPA firms with two sections, one for SEC Practice and another

for Private Companies Practice.

The two sections are substantially

parallel except that some of the requirements of the Private

Companies Practice Section are tailored to be more relevant to needs
of non-public companies.
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The SEC Practice Section imposes regulatory requirements
on participating firms (in addition to those previously mentioned)

as follows:

a.

Mandatory continuing professional education

of 40 hours a year for all professional staff
members.

b.

A mandatory peer review of the firm at least

every three years and at such other times as may
be imposed as part of a disciplinary action.
Such reviews will include investigation of

whether unreasonable time or fee pressures are
adversely effecting the quality of audits.

c.

Imposition of sanctions on firms found to be
deficient in meeting the quality control standards
of the AICPA.

d.

Annual filing of relevant information about the
firm for inclusion in files open to public inspection.
This will not, however, include financial statements.

e.

Maintenance of minimum amounts of legal liability
insurance as prescribed by the executive committee
of the section.
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The key to the success of this self-regulatory scheme
for CPA firms with SEC practice is the appointment of a Public

Oversight Board to monitor the operations of the section and report

at its discretion any information, findings or views to the SEC,
congressional committees or the public at large.
a.

The Board will:

Consist of five prominent individuals from outside
the profession and having unquestioned reputations

and integrity.

b.

Have access to all files, meetings and activities
of the section.
to hire its own staff as required.

c.

Have authority

d.

Be compensated from dues charged to member firms.

Although membership in the section is voluntary it is
believed that peer, client and public pressures will cause membership

for firms auditing SEC companies to be mandatory for all practical

purposes.
It is too early to know whether the Institute’s program

for self-regulation will function satisfactorily or whether it
will be given a chance to prove itself.

Congressman Moss has

promised to introduce legislation despite a hearing record that
does not support such action at this time.

Also, a lawsuit has

been filed against the Institute by a group of members seeking to

force submitting the division for firms program to a membership

referendum.
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Even though the outcome of these challenges is
uncertain I am optimistic that legislation will not be enacted

at this time and that the courts will confirm that a membership
referendum is not required under the Institute’s bylaws.

Given

the opportunity to function I believe that the division for firms

will prove to be an excellent vehicle for effective self-regulation.
III. Independence of Auditors and Improved Corporate Accountability

The concerns of the SEC and Congressional committees
regarding the independence of auditors are based upon the more

fundamental desires to achieve improvements in corporate account
ability.

Therefore any steps to enhance the independence of auditors

are really directed toward both objectives and I shall discuss them

in this context.

Perhaps the most important of the many recommendations
under this subject is the belief that independent audit committees

will be the cure for a great number of perceived deficiencies.

The

role of such committees is to act as a watchdog over the conduct

of management and to serve as a buffer between management and the

independent auditors.
The AICPA’s Board of Directors, at the strong urging of

the SEC, has appointed a special committee to study whether and
how the AICPA could impose a requirement for a public company to
have an audit committee as a condition of expressing an unqualified

audit opinion on the company’s financial statements.

The Institute

has agreed to use its best efforts to achieve such an objective
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probably through the establishment of an auditing standard

requiring a disclosure if a company fails to have a prescribed

type of audit committee.

In addition to audit committees a number of other
measures have been suggested by the SEC, the Commission on
Auditors’ Responsibilities and the report of the late Senator

Metcalf’s subcommittee.

The Institute has acted in response to

each of these recommendations and I will mention each of them

very briefly.
1.

The AICPA Board of Directors has endorsed the

concept that auditors review and publicly report
on systems of internal control of SEC companies
as separate engagements but not as a condition

to expressing audit opinions on financial state
ments.

It has directed AudSEC to develop standards

for such engagements.

A special advisory committee

composed principally of industry representatives

is working on the development of criteria for
evaluating systems of internal control.

In the

meantime AudSEC has issued a standard requiring

auditors to report on internal control deficiencies
to boards of directors or audit committees.

2.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the recommendation

that a report by management be included with
financial statements indicating the responsibilities
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being assumed by management.

A special committee

including industry representatives has been
appointed to develop the suggested form and content

of such a report.

3.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the concept of
adoption by management of policy statements on
expected conduct and that auditors should, as

a separate engagement, review and report on

management’s actions to assure compliance with its
policy statement.

AudSEC has been directed to

develop standards for such reviews and reports and
a special committee has been appointed to develop
a model for policy statements on conduct.

4.

The AICPA Board has endorsed the recommendation
that auditors be engaged, dismissed and make their

fees arrangements with the audit committee or
board of directors of their publicly-held audit
clients.

Implementation of this arrangement will

be studied by the special committee on audit com
mittees .

5.

The AICPA Board has embraced the concept that

auditors should be required to attend the annual
shareholder's meetings of their publicly-held
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audit clients.

The special committee on audit

committees will also seek ways to implement this

requirement.

6.

The AICPA Board supports the recommendation that

the present information required in 8-K reports,

when there is a change in auditors, should be dis
closed in all audited financial statements of SEC
companies.

However it is opposed to the inclusion

of reasons for the change as currently being pro
posed by the SEC.

The special committee on management

reports will seek ways to implement disclosure in

financial statements of the 8-K information.
7.

The SEC Practice Section for CPA firms has established
a requirement for its members that all disagreements
with SEC audit clients which, if not resolved, would

have resulted in a qualified opinion, be reported
in writing to the client’s audit committee or board

of directors.

8.

The SEC Practice Section for CPA Firms has, among
others, adopted the following requirements for its

members:
a.

Proscribed the performance of consulting

engagements involving psychological testing,
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public opinion polls, mergers and acquisitions
for a fee and certain aspects of marketing and
plant layout.

Actuarial services and executive

recruiting are currently being studied to deter
mine the extent to which such services should

be proscribed.

b.

Annual reports to the audit committee or
board of directors of SEC clients on the amount
of consulting fees and descriptions of the
types of consulting services provided during
the year.

c.

Annual reports to the section, for inclusion

in files open to the public, the per cent of
total fees represented by each of consulting,
tax and accounting and auditing services.

d.

Annual reports of the names of all SEC clients
from which the fees exceed 5% of the member’s
total fees.

e.

Mandatory rotation every five years of the

audit partner in charge of the audits of all
SEC clients.

f.

Mandatory concurring reviews of audit reports
of all SEC clients before issuance of such
reports.

A concurring review is one which is

-19conducted by a person not otherwise involved
in the audit.
There is little doubt that as all of the foregoing

measures are implemented there will be improvement in both the
independence of auditors and in corporate accountability.

However,

I fear that people in government may have expectations that these
actions will be a great panacea and that no future difficulties

will be encountered in financial reporting or corporate conduct.

If this is the case we are destined to experience another round
of investigation, hearings and criticism at some future date.

Let us hope that the perceptions at that time will be more

realistic and the expectations more reasonable.
IV.

Relief for Small and/or Closely Held Businesses
There is growing awareness within the profession and

in other sectors as well that, in setting accounting standards, too
little attention has been paid to their relevance when applied to

smaller privately held companies.

It has become increasingly

obvious that standards designed for publicly-held companies do not

always make sense with respect to non-public companies.

Some types

of disclosures are either irrelevant or their costs far exceed any

benefits to the users of financial statements in the particular
circumstances.
The report of the late Senator Metcalf’s subcommittee

and the report of the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities

both recognized this problem and urged that it be given greater
attention.

The Institute has been addressing this problem with
increasing urgency over the past three years.

several steps:

It has taken
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1.

A special committee has been working with the
FASB, the SEC and the AICPA Board of Directors

to urge the FASB to limit application of certain
portions of the financial accounting standards

to publicly-traded companies.

As a result of these

efforts the FASB has indicated its intent to exempt
non-publicly-traded companies from earnings-per-share
and segments of a business disclosures and has placed

on its agenda a proposal to include other types of
disclosures outside financial statements subject

to expressions of opinion by auditors.
2.

A previously appointed subcommittee of AudSEC

to deal with the subject of unaudited financial
statements has been upgraded to the status of a

senior committee with the authority to issue its

own standards on accounting and review type engage
ments.

An exposure draft of its first proposed

pronouncement has just been issued.

3.

The Private Companies Practice Section has been

established in part to facilitate tailoring practice

standards to recognize the differences in needs of
smaller privately-held companies.

By institutionalizing

the differences,the need for their recognition when
setting standards will be more widely accepted.
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Providing for exceptions in the application of

standards poses a difficult problem of educating users of

financial statements.

In addition, many practitioners have an

uneasy feeling that differential standards based upon size and
ownership of companies will lead to public perceptions that

there are first and second classes of financial statements and
first and second class auditors.

Of course, this condition

already exists to the extent that there are unaudited and audited
classifications.
The public and the profession cannot have it both ways.
Relief from unduly burdensome standards cannot be achieved for

smaller privately-held businesses without adopting exceptions to
the application of standards required for publicly-traded companies.
I believe the time to make such exceptions is overdue and that we
will be pursuing this course further in the coming months.

V.

Other Matters
The Institute has a great number of other changes underway

which are in various stages of implementation.

I will simply list

them for you without further explanation.

1.

Meetings of Council and senior committees are now
open to the public.

2.

We have voted in favor of adding three public
members to the Board of Directors.
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3.

We have reduced big 8 representation on all
senior committees to five or less.

4.

We have removed some of the secrecy from
disciplinary actions.

5.

We have voted in favor of modification of the rules
on advertising and solicitation, incompatible

occupations and employment of employees of other
CPA firms.

6.

We are embarked on a program to overhaul the
present standard auditor’s report.

7.

Adoption of a separate footnote describing
uncertainties is being urged for adoption by the

FASB.
8.

A continuing, committee on searching for and

detecting fraud has been appointed.

9.

We are attempting to develop criteria for

departures from generally accepted accounting

principles when there are unusual circumstances.
Summary and Conclusion

I believe that you will agree that what I have just

described constitutes an impressive and massive response to
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nearly all of the criticisms and recommendations that have
emanated from the two congressional subcommittees and the

Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities.

To be sure, many of

the actions will require a good deal of time to be fully implemented.
But the important thing is that they are all in motion and have

the full support of the Institute’s governing bodies.

Parts of

the program will require the cooperation and action by management
or other entities.

However we are dedicated to using our best

efforts to achieve the objectives that have been adopted.
We hope that the result of all these efforts will be:

1.

Retention by the private sector of the authority

to establish accounting and auditing standards.
2.

Enhancement of the credibility and accountability

of corporations and management.
3.

Enchancement of the quality of work and the

independence of auditors and the credibility of
the profession.

4.

Better regulation not only of individual CPAs but

of CPA firms under a self-regulatory scheme and

avoidance of the imposition by legislation of a
federal regulatory body for the profession.

5.

Greater participation by local practitioners in

the affairs of the profession.

-24-

6.

Establishment of a basis for drawing distinctions

between public and smaller non-public companies

for purposes of applicability of technical standards.
Will we be successful in achieving these results?
one can say for certain, but I sincerely hope so.

No

If we fail, it

will not be because we did not try our best to correct our faults
as perceived by our critics.

Despite all the problems I remain highly optimistic.
If we have the will, the imagination and the statesmanship we can

all make a great contribution to preserving our free enterprise

system and arresting the trend toward an all pervasive federal
government.

